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During the last three decades, the expansion of irrigation using both surface water and groundwater
resources has had an important positive impact on Syria’s agricultural production. It is an example of suc-
cess in achieving food policy objectives, but it has also introduced the challenge of groundwater sustain-
ability. This paper examines the trends in groundwater abstraction for irrigation and the effect of
government policies, including input subsidies – such as the diesel fuel subsidy and the crop procure-
ment price support. The fuel subsidy is an important driving force in groundwater depletion and over-
abstraction. This analysis examines the interaction between policy signals and the use and allocation
of water by farmers. The rapid decline in groundwater resources shows the limitations of this agricultural
development strategy and questions its sustainability unless policies change and the rate of abstraction is
changed so as not exceed the recharge rate.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
Water scarcity is globally recognized as a serious development
constraint and a potential source of international and intra-na-
tional conﬂicts. Lack of water is already constraining agricultural
production in many parts of the world (Biswas, 2010; FAO, 2009;
Jhorar et al., 2009; Dhehibi and Telleria, 2012). The Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) region is the most water scarce one in
the world (World Bank, 2007). Worldwide, the average water avail-
able per person is about 7000 m3/person/year; in the MENA region,
it is only around 1200 m3/person/year. In this region, the popula-
tion is expected to grow from about 380 million today to about
500 million in 2025 (World Bank, 2007), while per capita water
availability is expected to fall to 500 m3/person/year by 2025
(UNOCHA, 2010).
The challenges of water scarcity are heightened by the increas-
ing costs of developing new water resources, land degradation in
irrigated areas, groundwater depletion, water pollution, and eco-
system degradation (Rosegrant and Cline, 2003). Unsustainable
water management practices, which exceed the system’s carryingcapacity, impose direct signiﬁcant costs, in terms of lost farm pro-
ductivity, and indirect costs which are potentially enormous (Khan
and Hanjra, 2008). Over-extraction of groundwater and aquifer
depletion threatens many of the world’s most important food-
producing regions, including the North China Plain, the Indian
Punjab, parts of Southeast Asia, large areas of MENA, and much
of the western United States (Rosegrant and Cline, 2003; Postel,
1999). Results from recent climate change models suggest greater
water stress from decreased precipitation in many arid and semi-
arid regions worldwide, including parts of the Middle East, Africa,
Australia, and the United States (Qureshi et al., 2010; Christensen
et al., 2007). A fundamental shift in water and energy use is needed
in food policy to avoid a severe food crisis in the future (Hanjra and
Qureshi, 2010).
Excluding the Gulf region, agriculture is the largest consumer of
water in the MENA region, taking an average 85% of the supply
(Richards and Waterbury, 2008). Syria is located within the
water-critical region. Agriculture accounts for 87% of the water
withdrawn from Syria’s aquifers, rivers, and lakes (FAO AQUASTAT,
2012). Renewable water resources in Syria are estimated at
808 m3/capita/year (FAO AQUASTAT, 2012), which is below the
water scarcity threshold of 1000 m3/capita/year (Roudi-Fahimi
et al., 2009). With a rate of population growth consistent with
the UN’s medium variant population projection (UN-DESA, 2011),
the country will approach the absolute water scarcity threshold
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developments in neighboring countries are likely to reduce these
resources even further, considering that half of Syria’s annual
renewable water resources originate from cross-border ﬂow, with
the majority of it ﬂowing in from Turkey by way of the Euphrates.
Groundwater-based agriculture comprises 53% of the total irri-
gated land (MAAR, 2010). Expansion of the use of groundwater use
in agriculture has had a positive effect on production so far, but it
could have a considerable adverse effect on the availability of
water resources in the long run. In effect, the sustainability of agri-
cultural incomes and rural livelihoods are at stake. However, the
effects of such expansion on the sustainability of water resources
have received less attention than the effects on food and income
security. Policy makers have only recently come to consider the is-
sue of resource capacity (Salman and Mualla, 2008).
Energy, mainly diesel fuel, is used to power groundwater
abstraction and currently constitutes the major component of the
variable costs involved. Diesel prices in Syria increased with the
world oil price surge in 2011. Yet, diesel fuel prices remain subsi-
dized, and are reckoned to cost Syria around 5% of gross domestic
product (GDP) a year (The Economist, 2011). Prior to the increase
in these fuel prices, farmers did not consider the cost of pumping
to be a critical production constraint, though this perception might
change as a result of the higher diesel prices.
This study analyzes the effects of food and agricultural policies
on groundwater use in Syria. The driving forces that have contrib-
uted to the high-intensity of groundwater use in Syria are exam-
ined and their effects on the development of groundwater-based
irrigation are discussed, along with the potential consequences.
The study evaluates the effects of changes in energy prices (i.e.
through the removal of fuel subsidy) on the proﬁtability of differ-
ent crops. The study undertakes a simulation of how farmers might
respond, in terms of crop choice and water use, to changes in en-
ergy policy. We argue that groundwater abstraction in the dry
areas, if it continuously exceeds the recharge rate, resembles a
mining process – extracting a limited resource, with its inevitable
depletion and its economic, social, and environmental
consequences.
2. Background on Syria’s food and irrigation policies
Based on the overall government development policy objectives,
the expansion in irrigated agriculture in Syria can be categorizedSource: Authors’ elaboration based on data 
Fig. 1. Wheat and cotton cultivinto three broad phases. The ﬁrst phase, from 1966 to 1984, was
an expansion of irrigation systems as a result of policies to improve
food security and agricultural and rural development (Wakil, 1993).
Since the 1960s, wheat has covered more hectares than any other
crop in Syria. By 1966 wheat cultivation was already above
800,000 ha, providing more than 550,000 tons of wheat (FAOSTAT,
2013). By 2005, wheatwas covering almost 2million ha and this de-
creased to about 1.5 million ha by 2010. In general, wheat cultiva-
tion has followed an up and down pattern, though the long-term
trend was positive from 1966 to 2010 (Fig. 1). Cotton has been an
important crop since the 1960s. It accounted for 60% of the irrigated
land, or about 220,000 ha, in the period 1966–1969. The irrigated
wheat and vegetable areas each occupied 14% of the irrigated land
during the same period. During this period, the cotton area experi-
enced a declining trend; it recovered a little through the 1990s, but
again followed a downward trend from 2000 onwards.
The second phase marked the period between 1985 and 2000.
To ensure that production targets were met in this period, agri-
cultural production plans were drawn up every year for the
country’s main products and guaranteed prices were set for stra-
tegic crops, such as wheat and cotton. Farmers participating in
the ofﬁcial production schemes would receive direct subsidies
on farm inputs, such as seeds, fertilizers, farm equipment, and
fuel. Farmer participation was used to facilitate the granting of
well licenses, and sometimes these schemes took precedence
over the observance of drilling restrictions. Farmers registered
for government production schemes were given greater access
to low-interest loans, which were, in turn, used to purchase in-
puts. In addition, to allow farmers to dig wells and purchase
pumps, medium-term loans were provided at an interest rate
of 5%, which was low in comparison with the ofﬁcial rate of
9%, while the informal market rate could be as high as 50%.
(For a detailed description of the Syrian policy’s speciﬁc mea-
sures that related to irrigation water in the 1990s, see Varela-
Ortega and Sagardoy, 2001.)
As domestic diesel fuel prices did not ﬂuctuate in line with
international petroleum prices, the domestic diesel price in Syria
used to be as low as 20% of the world market price. The difference
was an explicit fuel subsidy. Of the various agricultural input sub-
sidies provided during the 1990s (Table 1), the largest was applied
to diesel fuel, constituting approximately 80% of the local purchase
price. Thus, in Syria, approximately 75% of the groundwater pumps
and well rigs and the equipment for drilling and deepening wellsfrom MAAR, Statistical Yearbook, 1980–2010.
ation in Syria, 1966–2010.
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(NAPC, 2003).
In response to subsidy policies, credit facilities, and crop price
support, the most dramatic shift started in the late 1980s through
the 1990s when groundwater-irrigated areas and the construction
of wells expanded rapidly – at an average annual growth rate of
15% (Fig. 2). As a result, by 2000 the irrigated areas had expanded
to about 1.2 million ha (double the area of 1984). The rapid growth
in irrigated wheat and cotton cultivation coincided with the
growth of fertilizer use and a rapid expansion in the exploitation
of groundwater from the expansion in artesian wells. (For a discus-
sion on the effects of irrigation on modern technology use for and
livelihoods from wheat production, see Mazid et al., 2003.)
During the period of rapid groundwater development (1990–
1997) the production of cotton rose from 160,000 tons to about
230,000 tons, at a rate of 6% a year. Similarly, wheat production in-
creased from 1.6 million tons to over 4 million tons, a growth rate
of around 15% a year. This implies that, during the period 1990–
2000, a considerable portion of the country experienced a shift
from rainfed farming to irrigated agriculture. More importantly,
most of this shift took place within a relatively short period of
time.
This expansion in irrigation and the changes in irrigated crop-
ping patterns have had several important implications. First, the
impact of policy on groundwater development was both clear
and dramatic. Before 1988, both the number of wells and the
groundwater-irrigated area were stable, with only about 53,000
wells being used to irrigate around 309,000 ha. By 1994, the num-
ber of wells had increased sharply, reaching around 124,000, whileTable 1
Subsidies on major production inputs based on the 1999 exchange rate in Syria.
Commodity Local prices (SYP) World market prices
Diesel fuel (L) 6.1 0.23
N fertilizer (kg) 8.3 0.18
P fertilizer (kg) 8.3 0.23
Note: Border prices = Exchange rate x World market prices (International FOB prices + tra
USD. (FOB = Free On Board).
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on FAOSTAT (2013) data on international market pri
Sources: Authors’ elaboration based on FAOSTAT (2013); MA
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Fig. 2. Total irrigated area, groundwater irrigated athe area irrigated with groundwater had increased to over
700,000 ha, accounting for about 64% of the total irrigated area
during the 1990s. Yet, between 2005 and 2009 the groundwater-
irrigated area declined to 53% of the total irrigated area (CBS,
2010) for the reasons discussed below when examining the third
phase.
This expansion in the use of groundwater irrigation increased
the incomes of those farmers who did not have access to canal irri-
gation, stabilizing and increasing their crop yields and allowing
them to beneﬁt from more secure livelihoods. Salkini and Ansell
(1992) estimated wheat yield responses to supplemental irrigation
to be 80% for high rainfall conditions, 125% for normal rainfall con-
ditions and 390% for low rainfall conditions. Because the majority
of the crops in the region are grown during the winter rainfall sea-
son (October to May), supplemental irrigation of winter crops has
increased and stabilized yields, overcoming the problems caused
by low and uncertain rainfall (Perrier and Salkini, 1991). Zhang
and Oweis (1999) found that to harvest 6.6 t/ha of durum wheat
grain, a farmer had to irrigate at a rate of 4500–5100 m3/ha
(510 mm) if 250 mm of rainfall (or 2500 m3/ha) was received.
These results supported the government’s policy of expanding sup-
plemental irrigation into rainfed areas, to increase productivity, re-
duce rural poverty, increase investment in agriculture, and slow
down rural/urban migration.
The third phase (2001–2010) was characterized by the chal-
lenge of dealing with groundwater depletion while ensuring food
security. The irrigation policy is still important in this phase to se-
cure food for the 21 million people living in Syria. The population is
growing fast – 2.9% in 2003 and 2.5% in 2010 (CBS, 2010). There is a(USD) Border prices (SYP) Input price subsidy (SYP)
11.54 5.44 (47%)
9.00 0.70 (8%)
10.72 2.42 (23%)
nsport). Exchange rate has been almost ﬁxed in Syria since 2000–2011, at SYP 50 per
ces.
AR (2010), the Annual Agricultural Statistical Abstract 
form, Damascus, Syria.
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2013) – in which agriculture employs around 15% of the total labor
force and accounts for 17% of total GDP (CBS, 2010).
As part of the strategy for economic development, major policy
objectives continued to be the achievement of self-sufﬁciency in
major food crops (particularly cereals), the stabilization of farm in-
comes through price-support measures, more rural employment
through increased agricultural production, greater foreign ex-
change earnings, and a secure supply of raw materials for domestic
industries (NAPC, 2006). In order to help achieve these objectives,
the government devoted 70% of its total agricultural budget to irri-
gation subsidies (Haddad et al., 2008). By 2008 it was estimated
that around 160 dams in Syria, with a total storage capacity of
14 billion m3, were operating (Haddad et al., 2008). Despite favor-
ing market-oriented policies in recent years, the government still
plays a signiﬁcant role in the purchase and trade of strategic agri-
cultural commodities (wheat, cotton, tobacco, sugar beet, barley,
lentils, and chickpeas), while the private sector has been left with
the trading of fruits, vegetables, and livestock products (Haddad
et al., 2008).
In this phase (Fig. 2) the number of wells grew steadily from
2001 to 2010, while the groundwater-irrigated areas were also
increasing, but at an ever slower rate, reaching an inﬂexion point
in 2005 when the actual groundwater-irrigated area started to de-
crease. This phenomenon means that the number of wells has been
increasing based on producers’ expectations that such investments
would be proﬁtable, while the decrease in the groundwater-irri-
gated area would suggest a drop in the productivity of wells and,
hence, the groundwater supply. Proﬁt, in turn, may be reduced as
result of declining water levels and the need to deepen wells – thus
increasing the cost of pumping – and the declining well yields fail-
ing to supply the required volume of water to the crops. Farmers’
expectations are based on successful past experiences. These
encourage them to make an investment today which will render
beneﬁts over the longer term. If a farmer digs a well and gets water
he/she will immediately realize short-term beneﬁts even if the
overall aggregate groundwater supply is reduced. So, the rational
expectation behavior (in the short term) and a decline in the
groundwater supply (in the long run), as a consequence of over-
pumping, are compatible. Eventually there will be a point where
producers correct their expectations and they will not see anyFig. 3. Water table level and annual precipitation at Tel Hadya Research Station (Aleppo
been recording water table data and precipitation levels at its research station and headqu
average rate of 1.5 m/year.more potential for investment in digging wells. But that would
probably be late in coming, when the aquifer has been depleted,
with substantial economic losses, including failed investments in
irrigation infrastructure (pumps, pipes, sprinklers, drippers, etc.).
In fact, declines in water levels and dried-up wells have been re-
ported throughout the country, such as in Zones 3 and 4 of Aleppo
province, which are lower rainfall zones (Luijendijk and
Bruggeman, 2008; Rida, 2003). The main water supply for Aleppo
city is surface water conveyed by canal from the Euphrates. The
aquifers in the area are predominantly limestone and chalky lime-
stone formations of limited extent and with low hydraulic conduc-
tivities (Luijendijk and Bruggeman, 2008). Thus, any groundwater
pumping in the urban area (which is very little) is not expected
to affect the groundwater resources of the rural communities in
the country side. At ICARDA’s headquarters’ research station (Tel
Hadya, Syria), located in the agricultural areas 25 km south of
Aleppo city, the groundwater level has fallen by 1.5 m/year over
the last 25 years (Fig. 3). The wells at the research station tap the
Neogene Helvetian limestone formation (Technoexport, 1966),
which is an unconﬁned aquifer that is recharged from the surface,
especially in rocky areas with shallow soils, and by local ephemeral
streams (wadis). Even though erratic, the level of rainfall at Tel
Hadya has shown neither an increasing nor a decreasing trend
since 1984. Despite this, the water table at Tel Hadya has been
found at incrementally deeper levels overtime, indicating that
the water extraction is higher than the natural recharge of the
aquifer and that eventually the aquifer might go dry. Hence, there
is a need for policy measures that help prevent areas like Tel Hadya
from suffering a complete depletion of groundwater.
3. Methodology
3.1. Theoretical framework
A farmer’s allocation of groundwater to different crops is inﬂu-
enced by production factor costs, crop prices, and government pol-
icies. Groundwater abstraction cost is a function of well depth, fuel
cost, and labor cost. The total factor cost of irrigation (TFC), was cal-
culated for each crop from the total number of pumping hours, the
amount of fuel used (in liters), the labor cost, and the cost of the
fuel, using the farm-gate fuel prices in Syrian pounds (SYP) (USD, Syria) for the period 1984–2010. Note: For more than 25 years. ICARDA, 1984 has
arters in Aleppo, Syria. The data shows that the water table has been dropping at an
208 A. Aw-Hassan et al. / Journal of Hydrology 513 (2014) 204–2151 = SYP 50 in 2000 and in 2011). Thus, a relation between the vol-
ume of groundwater abstracted from the aquifer (w) and the TFC
(measured in SYP/ha) was developed for each crop by ﬁtting the
data to the quadratic equation below,
TFC ¼ b0 þ b1wþ b2w2 ð1Þ
where b0 is a constant (ﬁxed cost of irrigation expressed in SYP/ha),
w is the volume of groundwater abstracted from the aquifer (m3), b1
controls for the symmetry of the function, and b2 is a parameter
which controls the rate of increase of groundwater abstraction.
The marginal irrigation cost (MIC) function was calculated from
the TFC function as the ﬁrst derivative with respect to w:
MIC ¼ dTFC
dw
¼ b1 þ 2b2w ð2Þ
The MIC measures the cost (SYP/m3) for each additional unit of
water pumped. Because there is a cost per unit of water pumped
from an aquifer, we analyzed the farmer’s groundwater use behav-
ior using a quadratic production function concept (Carlson et al.,
1993):
Y ¼ a0 þ a1wþ a2w2 ð3Þ
This yield function is presented in its generic form (displaying
positive sign just for the summation), where empirical estimations
of a2 are negative reﬂecting the law of diminishing marginal re-
turns. Y is crop yield (kg/ha), w the quantity of water applied
(m3), a0, a1 and a2 are the parameters to be estimated. This qua-
dratic function is based on two principles. The ﬁrst is that after a
certain level of irrigation has been applied to the crop, the output
will be subject to the law of diminishing returns, i.e. as more water
is applied, the increase in crop output will diminish. This is illus-
trated by the concept of marginal physical product (MPP), mea-
sured in kg/m3, which increases until the total product reaches
the ﬂex point where the additional output per unit of water de-
clines. From that point onwards total product increases, but at a
decreasing rate, until it reaches a maximum when MPP becomes
negative. This could be because excessive irrigation could cause
water logging or leaching of nutrient from the root zone. The
MPP is the ﬁrst derivative of the quadratic production function
with respect to the volume of water applied:
MPP ¼ dY
dw
¼ a1 þ 2a2w ð4Þ
MPP measures the amount of output obtained from each addi-
tional unit of water used. The second principle is that the per unit
cost of irrigation increases as more and more water is pumped and
applied to the crop. So higher water application levels are associ-
ated with higher per unit pumping costs of water and hence gen-
erate the upward sloping MIC curve for water. By multiplying the
MPP (kg/m3) by the crop price, P (SYP/kg), the value marginal prod-
uct (VMP), measured in SYP/m3, is obtained. The VMP is the value of
the extra crop output per unit of water, and can be computed for
each crop from a water-dependent production function and from
output prices. The proﬁt maximizing irrigation level is, therefore,
determined by comparing the per unit water costs (MIC) and the
VMP as derived from Eqs. (2) and (4):
w ¼ ðb1  Pa1Þ
2ðPa2  b2Þ
ð5Þ
Applications of volumes of water,w, higher than the proﬁt max-
imizing irrigation level will result in a net revenue loss for every
additional unit applied, since the per unit cost of water is higher
than its value. However, lower applications are suboptimal, as
the net revenue per additional unit applied can be augmented by
increasing the volume of water applied. The proﬁt-maximization
rule has several implications. First, the need to equate the VMPwith the MIC of the water provides a benchmark to either reduce
the quantity of water the farmer is using, or to use it optimally.
Second, as water becomes more scarce and more valuable, and as
the cost of pumping increases, the farmer would allocate water
to crops with a higher VMP,which will reduce the amount of water
allocated to relatively low-value crops that have a relatively high
water consumption. Third, as water becomes scarcer and pumping
more costly, producers could increase their net income by applying
less water and cutting down pumping costs.
3.2. Data
The main objective of this study was to analyze the effects of
food and agricultural policies on groundwater use in Syria. We
used a results of a survey on sustainable groundwater use collected
by ICARDA in 2003 (ICARDA, 2003), in which 30 farmers, located in
ﬁve villages (Faﬁn, Barshaya, Rbay’a and Bagat, Harbakieh and
Hobs, and Seyaleh) in four agro-climatic zones across northern Syr-
ia, were randomly selected (villages shown with blue dots in
Fig. 4). The selected farmers in those villages owned several wells
and participated in a water use monitoring scheme by measuring
the number of irrigations and the amount of water applied for each
crop and from each well. The number of data points collected for
each crop in each village is determined by the number of wells
and the number of crop plots irrigated from those wells. The reason
for using a 2003 survey was to assess how farmers would be af-
fected if the subsidies that the government provided in 2011 had
been gradually removed. More speciﬁcally, we tested how the
proﬁtability of cotton, wheat, cucumber, and beans would be af-
fected if the Syrian government had gradually removed the diesel
subsidy that was current until 2011 (latest data available).
The government of Syria uses stability zones as a reference for
agricultural planning. That is, cropping patterns in these zones
are determined centrally by the government and based on local
consultations and national objectives (NAPC, 2003). ICARDA se-
lected these four agro-climatic zones as they provide good repre-
sentation of the conditions of water scarcity in the region. There
are no prospects of them gaining access to surface-water irrigation
systems in the near future and intensive well drilling over the pre-
vious three decades has resulted in sharp drops in the groundwater
tables.
The relatively small sample size (30 farmers) was determined
by the farmers’ willingness to participate and accept frequent visits
to monitor pumping and irrigation practices and to measure and
record water abstraction data. Many farmers were reluctant to par-
ticipate in a study with this intensive data collection (ICARDA,
2003). However, it was decided that a sample of size 30 would
be sufﬁcient to determine independent random variables, which
will be approximately normally distributed, and thus generating
reasonably accurate parameters. Throughout the survey, the farm-
ers also recorded all the costs associated with crop irrigation,
including diesel, labor, and the amount of pumping time. The sur-
vey monitored water use and measured land attributes (such as to-
tal cultivated area, average holding size, and type of land holding –
whether private or public), well characteristics (starting when the
well was ﬁrst used for irrigation, initial and current well depth, and
depth of water intake), energy used in well operation (diesel and
electrically powered irrigation systems), and water allocations to
different crops.
We summarize these data in Table 2, which shows that in Zones
1 and 2, where precipitation levels are the highest in the sample,
better soil conditions allow for crop diversiﬁcation. Thus, cotton,
wheat, and vegetables (such as cucumber and beans) are cultivated
in all villages. In Rbay’a and Bagat, Harbakieh and Hobs, and Sey-
aleh, which correspond to Zones 3 and 4 with lower rainfall levels,
only cotton and wheat are cultivated, presumably prompted by the
Note: Northern Syria is divided into four agricultural stability zones (NAPC, 2003), where each zone is 
defined in terms of the average annual rainfall, as follows: 
- Zone 1: Fafin, annual rainfall of 350 mm and above 
- Zone 2: Barshaya, annual average rainfall between 300 and 349 mm 
- Zone 3: Rbay'a and Bagat, annual average rainfall between 250 and 299 mm 
- Zone 4: Harbakieh, Hobs and Seyaleh, annual average rainfall less than 250 mm (average rainfall 
in these villages is 200 mm). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on NAPC (2003), and Magellan Geographix Maps (www.maps.com). 
Fig. 4. Locations of the selected villages in northern Syria.
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land holding ﬂuctuates between 10 and 30 ha, and almost 100% of
the land is privately owned. This is an interesting feature as it has
encouraged private investment. Investments in wells for irrigation
purposes have been made for many years – ranging from 50 to
20 years before 2003. When wells were established, water was
found at depths of between 7 and 40 m, but 20–50 years later
water was found at depths of between 50 and 120 m.
The survey also shows that all the farmers interviewed used
diesel–fueled engines to pump water. This does not come as sur-
prise given that Syria’s policy to deliver food security consisted
of heavily subsidizing the use of diesel for irrigation purposes,
reaching a point where the domestic price of diesel in Syria was
as little as 20% of the world market price. All farmers’ wells tap
unconﬁned, upper aquifer systems. These aquifers consist of Neo-
gene and Paleogene limestone formations and a Pleistocene allu-
vial and proluvial formation in Seyaleh (Technoexport, 1966).
Some of the limestone formations extend across the border with
Turkey, but the hydraulic conductivities in these systems are so
low that any cross-border effects will be very local and will not af-
fect the study villages. The Qwayk River, a transboundary, ephem-
eral stream which passes near the village of Faﬁn, is dammed
upstream from the village, on either side of the border. Drilled
wells were by far the dominant type in these villages, which is
mainly explained by the long-life of drilled wells as compared to
Arabic (dug) wells. The life of drilled wells, like those in Barshaya
(Zone 2) and Rbay’a and Bagat (Zone 3) villages, can easily reach
50 years. Low and highly variable levels of rainfall, averaging less
than 400 mm/year (Table 2), have contributed to development of
wells. Access to groundwater allows farmers to stabilize and in-
crease the yields of their rainfed winter crops and to cultivate cot-
ton and vegetables during the dry summers.4. Estimation and results
4.1. Estimation procedure
We compared the value marginal product (VMP) with the mar-
ginal irrigation cost (MIC) in order to estimate the proﬁt maximiz-
ing irrigation level for the major crops (cotton, wheat, cucumber,
and beans). The gross margins per cubic meter for different crops
were calculated using crop budget data collected by ICARDA
(2003), and evaluated at the ofﬁcial prices for wheat and cotton,
and the market prices for the other crops (cucumber and beans).
The water use (w) of each crop was computed from the total
number of hours of irrigation and the measured discharge of each
well. If no well discharge was measured, water use was estimated
from the median irrigation depth for that particular crop in the vil-
lage. The farmers’ water use for irrigation was compared with the
crop water requirements for optimal yields. The crop water
requirements were computed from the farmers’ planting and har-
vesting dates, crop coefﬁcients and reference evapotranspiration,
following the procedures of Allen et al. (1998). Reference evapo-
transpiration was computed using climate data from nearby ICAR-
DA and government stations (Breda, Qurbatiyah, Aleppo). Finally,
the irrigation water requirements were obtained by subtracting
the observed rainfall. Although in each zone a farmer was supplied
with a rain gauge, farmers in only one village (Barshaya in Zone 2)
consistently measured daily rainfall. Therefore, for the other loca-
tions rainfall data from the above mentioned climate stations were
used. The computed irrigation water requirements are referred to
as technically recommended level. Policy impacts were assessed
by analyzing the effects that changes in diesel fuel subsidy had
on the relative proﬁtability of different crops and on the farmers’
choice of crops.
Table 2
Household characteristics of ﬁve villages in northern Syria.
Item Faﬁn (Zone 1) Barshaya (Zone 2) Rbay’a and Bagat (Zone 3) Harbakieh and Hobs, Seyaleh (Zone 4) Total or average
Number of farmers surveyeda 6 6 6 12 30
Total cultivated land (ha)a 2500 600 1500 1200 5800
Crop yield (kg/ha)
– Cotton 4250 3500 3625 2800 3544
– Wheat 3350 3950 4250 3150 3675
– Cucumber 20,000 23,200 21,600
– Beans 10,000 12,500 11,250
Average size of holding (ha)a 13 15 30 13 18
Type of land holding, private (%)a 100 95 100 100 –
Number of drilled wellsa 70 10 80 35 195
Number of dug (Arabic) wellsa 3 1 4 9 17
Number of shared wellsa 0 0 0 0 0
Number of abandoned wellsa 100 200 73 85 458
Beginning of well irrigation (years)a 35 50 50 25 –
Initial well depth (m)a 15 7 25 27 –
Current well depth (m)a 55–120 50 100 50 –
Depth of water intake (m)a 45–90 35 90 40 –
Diesel energy used for irrigation (%)a 100 100 100 100 –
Electricity energy used for irrigation (%)a 0 0 0 0 –
Elevation (m)a 416 461 362 400 409
Average precipitation (mm)b 350 300 265 230 275
Average evapotranspiration (mm)c 1500 1493 1544 1576 1537
a Source: Authors’ elaboration based on survey data generated by ICARDA (2003).
b Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data derived from ICARDA spatial datasets (De Pauw, 2001).
c Source: Authors’ elaboration based on ICARDA (2003) farmer survey data and ICARDA climate data in Qurbatiyah and Breda stations (Syria).
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By ﬁtting the survey data to the total factor cost of irrigation
(TFC) for cotton in Zone 1, the following functional relationship
was obtained:
TFC ðcottonÞ ¼ 129;016 13:68wþ 5E4ðw2Þ; R2 ¼ 0:64 ð6Þ
The R2 value (0.64) indicates that there is unexplained variance
in the model, yet the estimated TFC values reﬂect reasonably well
the reality in terms of irrigation costs in these villages (Table 3). By
taking the ﬁrst derivative of Eq. (6), the MIC function for cotton in
Zone 1 was derived as follows:
MIC ðcottonÞ ¼ 13:68þ 1E3ðwÞ ð7Þ
The MIC of Eq. (7) represents the supply function for water
withdrawn from an aquifer for any quantity above the minimum
average variable cost. In other words, the water supply curve can
also be considered as the cost per unit, or marginal factor cost, of
water. As expected the sign of the water coefﬁcient in Eq. (7) is po-
sitive, indicating that as more water is abstracted from the aquifer,
the cost of pumping an additional unit of water (or MIC) increases.
Data was ﬁtted to the production function for all crops in all zones.
For cotton the following relationship was obtained:
Y ðcottonÞ ¼ 25;230þ 3:2733w 9E5ðw2Þ; R2 ¼ 0:66 ð8Þ
The R2 squared value (0.66) indicates some unexplained vari-
ance in the model, but the Y values are reasonably well explained
by the quadratic function. The ﬁrst derivative of Eq. (8) provides
the MPP function for cotton in Zone 1 as follows:
MPP ðcottonÞ ¼ 3:2733 18E5ðwÞ ð9Þ
As expected the coefﬁcient of w in theMPP equation is negative
indicating that after a certain level of irrigation, the crop will be
subject to diminishing returns. That is, as additional units of water
are applied the extra output (measured in kg/ha) declines. Table 3
presents the coefﬁcients for both the quadratic production and cost
functions by crop and by zone.Assuming farmers are maximizing their proﬁts, they would
pump water at the level where the VMP is equal to the MIC. Hence,
by equating the VMP and MIC of water, the proﬁt maximizing irri-
gation levels were computed for all crops in the different zones. In
the case of cotton, the actual irrigation levels were in all cases
higher (32% on average) than the technically recommended level,
but the actual irrigation levels were much closer to the proﬁt max-
imizing irrigation levels – on average 7% lower (Table 3). These re-
sults point to two important points. First, they imply that farmers’
irrigation levels are close – within the margin of error – to the prof-
it maximizing irrigation levels, indicating that, given the prevailing
market signals and policy environment, farmers are within the
norms of rational behavior consistent with the economic parame-
ters of proﬁt maximization. In this case, farmers were behaving
with economic rationality in the short term given that they allocate
a cheap resource, i.e. water cost artiﬁcially reduced by subsidy, to
cotton that has a secured market and provides assurance in terms
of livelihoods. Secondly, comparing only observed water applica-
tions with the technically recommended levels, without consider-
ing the farmer’s response to price signals (either by market or by
the state through price support and subsidies) we can conclude
that farmers are over-irrigating. Apparently such analysis and con-
clusions are not fully informed and cannot provide policy guidance.
A more complete analysis, taking into account farmers’ responses
to prices, costs, and subsidies is required to understand their
behavior regarding groundwater use.
In the case of wheat, the actual irrigation levels for wheat were
higher (from 13% in Zone 4 to almost 50% in Zone 1) than the tech-
nical recommendation level. Then a logical reading would point to
over-irrigation. Yet, a more careful analysis shows that farmers
were actually applying water in quantities that were close to,
and in all cases less than, the irrigation levels which maximize
proﬁts. That is, by comparing the irrigation level which maximizes
proﬁts with the actual irrigation level (last column in Table 3), the
famers were close to, but less than, the proﬁt maximizing level (al-
most identical in Zones 2 and 3, and less than 23% lower in Zones 1
and 4). This is displaying a rational behavior in light of a subsidized
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hence to more income.
In Syria, vegetables, such as cucumber and beans, are generally
ruled by market forces, including the absence of price support, but
still enjoy support through diesel subsidy to pump groundwater.
For these crops the differences between actual irrigation levels,
the proﬁt maximizing levels, and the technically recommended
levels were much narrower than for cotton and wheat. Our esti-
mates of the proﬁt maximizing irrigation levels for cucumber and
beans were very close to the actual irrigation levels applied by
farmers, being on average 10% lower in the case of cucumber,
and almost identical in the case of beans.
This analysis shows that, in the short run, farmers allocate
water to crops in an economically rational manner. We found that
price support policies which beneﬁt cotton and wheat tend to
modify the proﬁt maximizing benchmarks. In the case of cucumber
and bean, this benchmark is much less exposed to direct govern-
ment intervention, which leads to more consistent market-ori-
ented proﬁt maximizing estimations for the observed irrigation
levels. Modiﬁcations in the maximizing parameters are made for
several reasons:
 Dictated higher and ﬁxed prices for cotton and wheat
strongly encourage farmers to allocate more production
inputs (including groundwater, which is fundamental in
dry areas) to these crops.
 Farmers operate under lower risk by cultivating cotton and
wheat as the prices are ﬁxed and government procurement
of the crops is guaranteed.
 Farmers have a lower incentive to focus on vegetable pro-
duction because it entails greater risk; most vegetables
need to be sold directly after harvest as vegetable prices
ﬂuctuate in line with market conditions.
 Farmers are aware that groundwater is a common resource,
so saving water in summer does not necessarily mean an
increase in the supply available in winter. They, therefore,
can be tempted to use more water than necessary as they
seek to satisfy their needs before their neighbors deplete
the resource. This depletion process is explained by the
theory of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968),
according to which individuals acting independently and
rationally corresponding to self-maximizing interest
behavior, collectively act contrary to the group’s long-term
most beneﬁcial interests by depleting the common
resource.
 Lack of accurate knowledge of either soil water conditions
or crop water requirements during the different crop stages
could lead to over- or under-irrigation.
 Groundwater abstraction continues to be over-abstracted
in the presence of input subsidy policies, which tend to off-
set the cost of abstraction as water becomes scarcer.
The effect of racing, or the rule of capture (Koundouri, 2004),
encourages farmers not to forego today’s pumping and minimizes
the opportunity for option value. But from the public perspective,
option value or inter-seasonal allocation of groundwater should
be an important policy consideration in groundwater management.
A conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that the behav-
ior of farmers is not the issue, as they behave rationally in terms of
maximizing beneﬁts. The issue is government policies that create
incentives for farmers to abstract groundwater at unsustainable
levels that are greater than technically and economically required;
but farmers do that by maximizing their proﬁts in response to
these policies and market signals. The adjustment to correct this
problem of groundwater overuse has to mostly be solved from
the policy side.
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In this section we look at the level of subsidy for diesel relative
to 2011 and test how the gradual elimination of this subsidy would
affect the proﬁtability of cotton, wheat, cucumber and beans.
Changes in irrigation costs, as a result of changes in fuel costs, will
have varying effects on the proﬁtability of different crops being
planted. To determine the effects of increased fuel costs on the
proﬁtability of these crops four scenarios, reductions of 25%, 50%,
75%, and 100% in fuel subsidy were simulated. Then, changes in
gross margin for each crop and zone were estimated according to
gradual lifting in diesel subsidy. In the analyses, other variable
costs and government price supports were held constant, and the
use of the surface irrigation method was assumed.
As a result of higher fuel costs to the farmers, the greatest de-
cline in gross margins per hectare was estimated to be for crops
cultivated in dryer conditions (villages located in Zones 3 and 4),
which depend more on groundwater for irrigation (Table 4). The
analyses show that cotton farming would not be proﬁtable in the
drier Zones 3 and 4 if the diesel subsidy is decreased by just 25%.
Losses in these zones would further increase with decreases of
50%, 75%, and 100% in the diesel subsidy. Unproﬁtability occurs be-
cause wells are deeper and recharge is much lower, thus the cost of
pumping becomes higher. Thus in Zones 3 and 4, farmers become
losers if subsidies on diesel are removed. Unproﬁtable farming is
not an intended output of the policy, particularly in the poorest
areas. If the diesel subsidy is removed, the challenge consists of
introducing compensatory measures which will ensure alternative
sources of income to affected households. In Zones 1 and 2, which
are the relatively less dry of the four zones, as the subsidy is grad-
ually removed the proﬁtability of cotton decreases. Our estimates
show that farming cotton in Zone 2 could withstand up to 75% re-
moval of the subsidy which, as expected, would result in smaller
beneﬁts. In Zone 1, where rainfall is more copious and consistent,
cotton farming would stand a complete removal in diesel subsidy.
If the fuel subsidy was reduced by 25% or more in Zone 4, then
wheat production would not be proﬁtable. In Zones 1, 2 and 3,
wheat production would be a loss-making activity if fuel subsidy
would be completely removed. In Zones 1, 2 and 3, wheat faming
could withstand up to 50% removal of the subsidy given that in
Zones 1 and 2 particularly higher rainfalls allow farmers to use less
groundwater in crop irrigation. The rainfall also makes the farmers
less dependent on the subsidy to achieve proﬁtability in crop
production.
Cucumber and beans are grown in Zones 1 and 2 only. As the
diesel subsidy is removed, the proﬁtability of cucumber and beans
(measured in gross margin per hectare) drops but not as much as
cotton. This is because vegetables (including cucumber and beans)
require less water than cotton, and hence drop in gross margin
were much lower allowing for still proﬁtable farming even in the
face of complete discontinuation in diesel subsidy. These results
suggest that removing the subsidy on diesel will have a greater
negative effect on crops with a high consumption of water, such
as cotton, because higher fuel prices will more seriously affect
low water-productive crops, such as cotton, and less seriously af-
fect high water productive crops, such as vegetables.
Hence, the government has a key role to play by adjusting the
subsidy policy in such a way that subsidy support would not be-
come an incentive to drill more wells in dry areas. Correcting the
subsidy would reduce the intensity of groundwater pumping and
it could induce farmers to shift to less water-demanding crops
and/or adopt water-saving irrigation technologies. Bathla (1999),
while examining the linkages between water demand and agricul-
tural development in Central Punjab (India), similarly concluded
that because of the ‘public good’ characteristics of water, the role
of government, especially in setting agricultural policies, is critical
A. Aw-Hassan et al. / Journal of Hydrology 513 (2014) 204–215 213if sustainable water use is to be achieved. It is important to clarify
that this analysis applies to four geographical zones in Aleppo
Province. To analyze how subsidy removal/reduction would affect
national production of wheat, cotton and vegetables (such as
cucumber and beans), including balance in food production and
water sustainability, national storage, imports, supply and trade,
a general equilibrium approach would be needed. That approach,
which is beyond the scope of this research, would be instrumental
to get into a macro analysis of the trade-offs emerging from differ-
ent policy scenarios and associated outcomes.
Farmers revealed that in areas where aquifer depletion was
complete, farm households were no longer able to sustain them-
selves through rainfed cropping, and therefore tended to migrate,
searching for jobs in urban centers or in irrigated areas, where they
were able to work as laborers on summer crops (ICARDA, 2003).
These are long-term outcomes which are contrary to the intended
food policy/security objectives. Therefore, questions arise as to
whether the groundwater-based agricultural production and food
security induced by government food policies can be sustained.
Unabated depletion of groundwater could ultimately reduce farm
incomes and have a negative consequence for rural livelihoods.
The Syrian Government introduced a new policy strategy that
consisted of rationalizing the use of groundwater and river water.
This policy was operationalized through the Water Law No. 31 an-
nounced by the Ministry of Irrigation in 2005, but implemented as
from 2008 until 2011 (discontinued due to the social unrest con-
ﬂict in Syria). The policy consisted of rationalizing the use of
groundwater by introducing a set of measures that aimed at con-
trolling the amounts of groundwater abstracted. The main policy
measures include:
 Banning the cultivation of summer crops on the steppe (limited
level of compliance).
 Establishing irrigation fees. Issuing a license for drilling wells or
installing pumping equipment, a fee of 5000 SYP as a lump-sum
shall be collected from license holders (not enforced).
 Limiting the amount of groundwater extracted within the quan-
tity limit of the water resources available in each basin (not
enforced).
 Applying penalty fees to farmers exceeding the maximum
groundwater allocation per hectare established by law, and
removing groundwater license to recidivist farmers (not
enforced). In fact, the government limits the amount of water
through the construction of sized channels that do not allocate
much water to ﬁelds.
 A program for installing ﬂow meters in wells (not yet fully
implemented).
 Linking-up well licensing to the adoption of modern irrigation
practices (not enforced).
 Providing cheap credits to farmers to purchase agricultural
inputs (barely started);
 Coordinating the agricultural plan and the growing of strategic
crops with irrigation water availability (still in progress).
 Increasing extension efforts to raise farmers’ awareness of efﬁ-
cient water use practices (in progress).
 Encouraging the creation of water user associations (in
progress).
 Improving equity in river water distribution in favor of farmers
that are at the end of water channels (in progress).
 Converting, through support program, traditional irrigation sys-
tems into modern irrigation schemes from 2011 to 2015 (did
not start).
 Increasing the cost of groundwater pumping to adjust for the
changes in world oil prices (diesel fuel prices increased from
SYP 7.4 (USD 0.15) per liter in 2008 to SYP 20 (USD 0.40) per
liter in 2011.Thesemeasures are considered positive steps. However, the level
of implementation of the regulations clearly needs to be improved if
the policy measures are to be effective. In addition, complementary
policies, such as gradual elimination of the diesel subsidies for
groundwater abstraction, will provide incentives to earmark re-
sources according to their real opportunity costs, and to allocate
water to commodities that are more proﬁtable to farmers. As dis-
cussed in Table 4, it could lead to allocating production resources
to less water intensive crops. Complementary, technical advisory
services and more supportive credit facilities in the form of low
interest rates should be promoted such that farmers can easily
adopt modern irrigation technologies, like sprinkler and drip irriga-
tion systems. The government might also consider banning license
renewals to replace dried-upwells. These agricultural policies listed
above show that in Syria there is no shortage of policies, but a seri-
ous issue is that institutions are weak in their delivery of policies.
The government might consider a long-term plan to reinforce insti-
tutions. The full impact of the various water-conservation policies
are still to be evaluated, and will depend heavily on how effective
the Syrian institutions are in driving their implementation.
5. Conclusions
The Syrian government’s food and development policy has
encouraged the rapid expansion of groundwater exploitation in
the country over the last three decades. This policy was based on
an expansion of the irrigated areas, which are supplied with both
surface water and groundwater, but without consideration being
given to the sustainability of the groundwater resources. Agricul-
tural policies, such as the provision of subsidies for diesel and price
support for strategic crops, which stimulated groundwater use, had
positively affected input use and agricultural production. These
improved food security and increased farm income. However, in
the long term, the effects on sustainable groundwater use, particu-
larly in the drier regions, could be negative because of declining
well productivity and the falling water table levels of the aquifer.
Therefore, it is possible that the carrying capacity of the groundwa-
ter aquifers will continue to decline to such an extent that there
will not be adequate amounts of water to irrigate the areas cur-
rently serviced with groundwater.
The results show that the actual irrigation levels for cotton and
wheat were higher than those technically recommended. These re-
sults could mean that farmers have been applying more irrigation
water than is economically justiﬁed. However, from the proﬁt
maximizing perspective, the actual irrigation level for these crops
were in general close to (but lower than) the proﬁt maximizing
irrigation. This implies that farmers actually took their decisions
following rational economic behavior in the short term. That is,
their actual irrigation levels were reasonably close to the irrigation
levels which maximize proﬁts, implying economic rationality in
the use of a cheap resource (water) for crops which have secured
markets (cotton and wheat) and provide assurance in terms of live-
lihoods. Our estimates of the proﬁt maximizing irrigation levels for
cucumber and beans were fairly close to the observed and techni-
cal requirement levels.
In the case of cotton and wheat, we observed that farmers were
consistent with the proﬁt maximizing criteria, but with distorted
incentives. This has happened for several reasons:
 Dictated higher and ﬁxed prices for cotton and wheat
drive farmers to produce crops that are ‘safe’ in terms
of securing household income.
 Having the government buying all the cotton and wheat
produced at ﬁxed prices encourages farmers to allocate
more production inputs (including groundwater) to
these two commodities.
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tion as this implies facing all the risks associated with
the marketing of these commodities – selling quickly
as they are perishable items, transportation costs, and
the ﬂuctuating prices for vegetables.
 Groundwater being a common resource means that sav-
ing water in summer does not necessarily increase
water supply for winter crops; therefore farmers seek
to satisfy their needs before their neighbors deplete
the resource (‘tragedy of the commons’).
 Farmers do not always have accurate knowledge of soil
water requirements, which could lead to over- or under-
irrigation.
The results of the different scenarios modeled in this study
show that a reduction in, or the removal of, the diesel fuel subsidy
will affect the proﬁtability of all crops. The decline in gross margins
per hectare in cotton was estimated to be highest in the villages lo-
cated in the drier areas (Zones 3 and 4). The analyses show that
cotton farming would not be proﬁtable in drier areas (Zones 3
and 4) if diesel subsidy would be reduced by just 25%. In Zone 2
if diesel subsidy would be completely removed then cultivating
cotton would become unproﬁtable. Only in Zone 1 (most favorable
area) cotton would be cultivated without fuel subsidy, but gross
margins would be diminished. In the case of wheat, a 25% decrease
in diesel subsidy would be enough to make it unproﬁtable in Zone
4, while in Zones 2 and 3 a 50% removal would make wheat pro-
duction unproﬁtable. Wheat would be proﬁtable in Zone 1 if at
least 25% diesel subsidy is provided. More viability of cotton and
wheat in Zones 1 and 2 can be explained by higher rainfalls in
these zones that allow for less groundwater to be used for crop irri-
gation. In Zones 1 and 2, vegetables (cucumber and beans) remain
proﬁtable even when fuel subsidy is removed. These results sug-
gest that as water becomes scarcer and pumping becomes more
costly, farmers could increase water productivity by shifting from
crops with high water consumption to those with a short growing
season, such as vegetables.
From a macro perspective, this study shows that balancing
short-term productivity growth with the long-term negative im-
pacts of groundwater depletion is a challenge facing policy mak-
ers. In the drier areas, regular monitoring of groundwater levels,
as well as of farming and irrigation practices, would provide the
information needed to meet this challenge. The expansion in
groundwater-based farming and the associated depletion of aqui-
fers in the drier regions of Syria suggests that aquifers are subject
to fast depletion. This supports the hypothesis that groundwater
abstraction in the dry areas resembles the mining of limited re-
source. We showed that the process of groundwater mining seems
to follow a pattern where there is an initial high quantity of
groundwater for irrigation purposes, followed by a sharp decline
within a short period of time. The decline, driven by excessive
well drilling and over-abstraction, can lead to the exhaustion of
groundwater.
The government should consider a gradual removal of the diesel
subsidy for the pumping of water, while fostering a system that
introduces measures to ensure alternative sources of income to af-
fected households. Complementary policies, such as introducing
credit facilities (so that farmers can easily adopt improved irriga-
tion technologies), a regulated system that prevents over-pump-
ing, and restricting license renewals through which new wells
are drilled to replace dried-up ones, should be considered. Overall,
policies should support new irrigation technologies associated
with cropping patterns that will help limit the mining and absolute
depletion of groundwater aquifers, and lead to a more economi-
cally sustainable use in the long term.Appendix A. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.
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